zkLink Nova Bridge Loses $786K After Attacker Forges Withdrawal Data
- zkLink Nova's Ethereum bridge lost approximately $786,000 due to a forged withdrawal exploit on October 28.
- The vulnerability stemmed from a failure in the claimMessage function, allowing unauthorized withdrawals.
- Users should monitor their assets and stay informed about potential impacts on withdrawal requests from zkLink Nova.
An attacker drained approximately $786,000 from zkLink Nova’s Ethereum bridge on October 28 after inserting a forged batch root that allowed unauthorized withdrawals to pass the network’s verification checks.
Blockchain security firm Blockaid identified the exploit in an October 29 security alert, explaining that the attacker used a publicly accessible relayer to introduce fraudulent settlement data before withdrawing ETH and ERC-20 tokens from the bridge’s custody contracts. The firm described the attack as ongoing when it issued the warning.
The main transaction occurred at 22:21 UTC on October 28, transferring 22.43 ETH and 11 different ERC-20 tokens to an attacker-controlled wallet.
The largest withdrawal involved approximately 245.74 pufETH, worth around $615,000. The attacker also extracted 18,113 USDC, 3,361 USDT and several liquid staking tokens.
The main transaction was valued at roughly $779,000 using token prices recorded after the attack. Blockaid’s $786,000 figure represents its preliminary estimate of the incident’s total losses, rather than an additional withdrawal.
Flaw in Message Verification Allowed Forged Batch Root
SlowMist traced the vulnerability to the claimMessage function in zkLink Nova’s Arbitrator contract, which handles messages between connected blockchain networks.
According to its technical investigation, the function failed to clear a temporary verification value called finalizeMessageHash between calls. This allowed the attacker to reuse a previously established hash within the same transaction without obtaining fresh message authentication.
The attacker combined this weakness with the SyncL2TxHashRelayer contract, which was publicly callable but recognized by the system as an authorized relayer.
By manipulating the message execution path, the attacker caused syncBatchRoot to accept a fabricated batch root on Ethereum.
Batch roots serve as cryptographic commitments to transaction records and are used to verify whether withdrawals originated from valid activity on zkLink Nova. Once the forged root was accepted, the attacker could supply withdrawal proofs matching the fraudulent data and release assets held by the bridge.
The attack did not establish a failure of Ethereum’s consensus or Nova’s underlying zero-knowledge proof system. The identified weakness concerned the authentication of cross-chain messages used to authorize withdrawals.
A different verification failure was central to April’s $292 million KelpDAO exploit, where compromised off-chain infrastructure enabled a forged cross-chain message to be accepted.
Stolen Assets Moved Across Multiple Wallets
Following the withdrawals, the attacker exchanged much of the stolen token balance for ETH through decentralized trading services.
Approximately 303 ETH was subsequently distributed across three addresses in separate transfers shortly after the exploit.
Blockaid initially warned that the affected bridge infrastructure remained exposed. As of October 29, zkLink had not publicly confirmed that the vulnerability was contained, announced a verified recovery of stolen funds or provided a final accounting of the losses.
The project had also not established whether the incident would affect outstanding withdrawal requests or require compensation for users whose assets were held in the affected contracts.
